Recent crises and the expansion of international financial arrangements have dramatically elevated the importance of cooperation between regional institutions and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While the case for coordination between regional and multilateral institutions is generally accepted, however, the need to organize it on an ex ante basis is not fully appreciated. The relatively successful cooperation among the European Commission, European Central Bank, and IMF on the European debt crisis is not likely to be easily replicated in joint programs for countries in other regions, moreover, and the costs of coordination failure could be very large. Recent innovations at the IMF, on the other hand, present opportunities for cooperation with regional facilities. This paper reviews (1) the case for organizing cooperation on an ex ante basis, (2) the policy and institutional matters that should be coordinated, (3) how East Asian arrangements in particular and the IMF might cooperate, and (4) an Interinstitutional Agenda of general principles, modalities, and institutional recommendations. The G-20, member states, and institutions themselves should address this agenda proactively.
INTRODUCTION
Since its creation, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has coexisted with various bilateral, regional, and other multilateral financial facilities. These have ranged in character from the European Payments Union (EPU) established in the 1950s to the network of bilateral swap arrangements established by the Group of Ten (G-10) central banks during the 1960s and East Asia's current Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM). The IMF and its member states are thus fairly accustomed to cooperating with other arrangements and institutions in financial rescues in various regions, but they have done so in an ad hoc rather than systematic fashion over the years.
With the progressive increase in the frequency and severity of financial crises, expansion in the size and number of regional financial arrangements, and increase over the last decade in the level of international reserves, which can be placed at the disposal of bilateral and regional facilities, the necessity and complexity of coordinating these facilities with the IMF increases dramatically. These developments raise the stakes on policy issues associated with coordination-such as the relative contributions of regional and multilateral facilities, conditionality, terms, and negotiating modalities-and institutional issues-such as channels of communication, representation, and even membership. Given its momentum, regionalism probably poses the most important long-term challenge to the IMF and its role in the international monetary and financial system. Three events make this agenda for cooperation between regional financial arrangements and the IMF particularly important at the moment. First, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus China, Japan, and Korea (ASEAN+3) has made the CMIM operational and is creating a surveillance unit based in Singapore in 2011. Second, the financial crisis in Europe's Southern tier led to a rescue package for Greece of unprecedented size and the establishment of a new, nearly $1 trillion arrangement; that arrangement was then activated for Ireland in autumn 2010. Both the Greek and Irish programs mix European and IMF financing, and the stakes in mixed rescue packages have now become enormous.
Finally, the IMF has conducted a review of its own financial facilities, expanded their scope, and launched an effort to engage regional financial arrangements through them. 1 It is important to recall that the member states lead the process of creating multilateral and regional financial facilities and amending them. Very few national governments have been content with relying solely on the IMF for balance of payments and other official financing. Most have engaged or contributed to bilateral, regional, and plurilateral financial facilities as well, including the large members with substantial weight in the IMF, such as the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Japan. But when establishing new financial facilities or amending existing ones, these governments often gave short-shrift to, and sometimes ignored, the consequences of creating one facility for its older siblings.
The members of the Group of Twenty (G-20) hold 65.8 percent of the quotas and 64.7 percent of the votes of the IMF. At the same time, almost all of them participate in a bilateral or regional financial arrangement; one member, the European Union, is itself a regional organization that operates several financial arrangements. As essential players at all these levels, the members of the G-20 are best situated to mandate cooperation among them. Getting the relationship between regional and multilateral financial facilities right is critical to the effectiveness of global governance, moreover, and to successfully dispatching the recent economic crisis. The subject is thus an appropriate agenda item for the G-20 finance ministers' meetings and leaders ' summits. 2 In this paper, first, I briefly review the experience with recent joint programs that motivates this analysis. Second, I review the case for cooperation between regional financial institutions and the IMF.
Third, I enumerate the specific issues-both policy and institutional-that arise when mixing regional with multilateral finance. Fourth, I compare the more important regional financial arrangements with respect to their posture toward the IMF. Fifth, I examine the relationship between the IMF and East Asian financial arrangements in particular, enumerating proposals for cooperation between them. I conclude by proposing an Interinstitutional Agenda of basic principles for organizing region-IMF cooperation, specific guidelines for a code of conduct, and institutional reforms. Such recommendations can guide the design and evolution of institutions at both levels.
The position advanced here supports both financial regionalism and multilateral norms and rules for regional arrangements. My argument thus occupies a middle ground between multilateral purists, who tend to privilege the IMF as the dominant, if not the exclusive, international instrument for fighting financial crises, 3 and unbridled regionalists, who tend to promote regional arrangements unfettered by the IMF or multilateral rules. 4 Both the IMF and regional financial arrangements are here to stay; a more reliable groundwork must be laid for their mutual coexistence and cooperation.
The ultimate objective of the present exercise, to be clear, is to secure the economic and financial stability of member states and the international economic system. The prerogatives of multilateral and regional institutions might be of intense interest to officials in these organizations and the member states, and realism dictates sensitivity to these concerns, but securing or expanding bureaucratic turf is not the purpose of this paper. Cooperation between the IMF and regional institutions is thus advocated in order to foster stability. Proposals for innovative facilities and policies should be tested against this metric.
A word about those topics that fall outside the scope of this study is in order. While this paper addresses conflict and cooperation between regional financial facilities and the IMF, it does not examine the normative case for either regional or multilateral institutions per se. It is premised on the conviction that the case for both is strong. Nor does the paper examine the broader issues of regional integration, reform of the IMF beyond the connection to regionalism, and global governance generally. These topics are the subject of numerous other studies.
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RECENT EXPERIENCE
This study is inspired by a string of cases over the last decade and a half that have mixed bilateral, regional, and IMF funds in financial rescue programs (see appendix A). While successful, these programs raised important questions about cooperation and the division of labor across the financial facilities at the three different levels. At the outset of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, the Japanese Ministry of Finance famously advocated the establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) that would not have included the United States and could have displaced the IMF from the region. As a substitute for the AMF proposal, which was not adopted, East Asian governments launched the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) in 2000 and, as mentioned, created the CMIM in 2010. However, the CMIM retains the "IMF link"-which requires borrowers to negotiate a program with the IMF in order to obtain most of the regional funds-and it has not been activated. How ASEAN+3 would coordinate any activation of the CMIM with the Fund in practice remains vague and untested.
Meanwhile, the recent global economic and financial crisis witnessed a series of new programs in which IMF funding was mixed with regional and bilateral assistance, first principally in Central and Eastern Europe, then in Greece and Ireland. The Latvian program is particularly instructive because it is a case where the Fund differed with the regional partner, the European Union, yet the conflict was successfully resolved.. When capital withdrawal became pronounced, Latvian authorities reportedly approached the IMF. European officials objected that Latvian officials were obligated to consult with them prior to such an approach and, once negotiations were under way, objected to the IMF's proposed devaluation of the lats. 6 Maintaining the peg to the euro required considerably greater austerity and a 5. Reform of the IMF and the evolution of the G-20 are examined in Truman (2010) , among a number of other places. were negotiating the broader package of fiscal and structural agreements with which the ESM might be adopted.
The European experience raises two points. First, the region with the best-developed regional institutions, including a common currency and elaborate regional surveillance mechanism, was not sufficiently equipped to deal with a major financial emergency among one of its member governments.
This should give pause, to say the least, to officials in other regions who want to chart a long-term path to autonomy from the IMF. ASEAN+3 in particular must realize that, although their surveillance mechanism, the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), is scheduled to be launched soon, it is unlikely to approach the capacity needed to delink from the IMF with confidence as presently constituted.
Second, despite having reluctantly turned to the IMF in the heat of the Greek crisis and incorporated a continuing role for the Fund in the ESM, several European officials regard this necessity as an embarrassment and wish to build the institutional infrastructure within the euro area that will someday obviate resort to the Fund. Such a movement would have substantial implications for (a) The present managing director not only is a European but was integrally involved in the construction of the institutions of the monetary union as the finance minister of France. Both factors greatly facilitated EU-IMF cooperation in these cases but also distinguish Europe from the other regions.
Finally, the frequency and severity of crises are likely to persist over the long term, and domestic political resistance to large financial packages and the adjustment conditions attached to them could well constrain policymakers who would be otherwise disposed to interinstitutional cooperation. The prospect that regional and multilateral institutions could fail to coordinate in the heat of a crisis and thus fail to stem (or even contribute to) financial turmoil-a "train wreck" scenario-is likely to increase over time, reinforcing the case for ex ante arrangements.
Ultimately, the need for cooperation between regional and multilateral financial institutions inheres in their origins. Member states have created these facilities and institutions to serve their common purposes in fostering international economic openness. They have done so, however, often without regard to how the two levels should relate to each other. There is no formal hierarchy among the international and regional organizations; nor is there an explicit set of rules or formal conventions specifying how the 9 IMF should relate to regional organizations. 11 Norms and informal conventions might apply but exercise relatively weak guidance for each new joint financial package and are subject to renegotiation. The most influential member states thus broker coordination in an ad hoc fashion as the need arises, in consultation with the senior management of the institutions. Satisfactory outcomes thus hinge on agreement among the powerful members. The process by which this is achieved is generally not at all transparent.
ISSUES FOR COOPERATION
Several points of potential conflict arise between regional financial arrangements and the IMF and define the agenda for cooperation. Those points fall under the headings of (a) policy issues-specific elements of individual country programs that should be reconciled-and (b) institutional issues-the mandates, governance, and memberships of the regional arrangements and the IMF. This section highlights the policy issues, enumerates the institutional issues, and identifies a spectrum of possibilities for region-IMF cooperation.
Policy Issues
Several specific issues arise when regional and multilateral arrangements are called upon to work together.
Though these issues are fairly evident, the solutions can be complex and agreement on them cannot be taken for granted.
Contributions.
The first question that arises in a joint financial rescue by the IMF and a regional financial facility is the size of the overall package and the relative contributions of the participants.
Sometimes the IMF takes a dominant share; in other cases the IMF takes a minority share. The mix has ramifications for (a) the adequacy of the package, (b) relative influence of the contributors, and thus (c) conditions attached to the program. There is a clear sense that "he who pays the piper calls the tune."
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Terms of Assistance. The maturity, interest rate, currency, and possibility for renewal are standard elements of loans and other financial arrangements. These have ramifications for which creditor would be drawn upon most heavily and be repaid first and most profitably. The terms do not have to be uniform, but the collective action problems must be addressed. The same can be said for provisions relating to collateral, default, collective action clauses, and recourse.
11. Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Article 5 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provide such rules in the international trade regime.
12. See, for example, Gould (2003) .
Policy Conditionality. The policy adjustments required of the borrower can be highly controversial.
Will there be one global standard for adjustment and financing or several regional standards? 13 Which institution, the IMF or the regional facility, sets the policy conditions in joint packages? How are conflicts over conditionality resolved? What is the mechanism for resolving them?
Negotiating Modalities. How is the mission that is sent to negotiate the program with the borrower composed? Who conducts the analytical work on the spot? How is a joint position, if there is one, prepared? Who takes the lead in the actual negotiations? Recent experiences with IMF/EU programs in Central and Eastern Europe, Greece, and Ireland provide some ad hoc answers to these questions.
Whether these are positive models or negative models depends on one's particular perspective within these organizations.
Transparency. International financial facilities differ greatly with respect to disclosure regarding terms of programs and institutional decision making. In joint operations, whose transparency protocol should be followed, that of the most or least transparent institution? My answer would be the most transparent; but practice has often followed the least common denominator.
Bailouts of Regions.
The question arises of whether one official creditor would be taking on the exposure of other official creditors over the course of a crisis. If a regional facility mishandles an operation, the IMF could be called upon to take over the program or, if the crisis has become pan-regional in the meantime, rescue multiple countries in the region. At that point, any refusal by the IMF could endanger systemic stability and generate opposition among members, placing the IMF in a disadvantageous position.
Central banks, finance ministries, and the IMF alike are thus concerned about being excluded from decision making during an initial stage of a rescue and then, when the crisis has become more acute, inheriting the operation in a subsequent stage.
14 Bilateral and regional creditors have sometimes extended bridge financing and been subsequently reimbursed with the proceeds of an IMF loan. Bridge financing should be distinguished from an inherited rescue, however. An expectation that the IMF and the borrower will be agreeing upon a program accompanies the case of bridge financing and the Fund specifies requisite policy conditions at the outset. In the inherited-rescue scenario, by contrast, the IMF would not have the opportunity to 13. A question posed by Truman (2010, 6 ).
14. Article VI, section 1 of the IMF's Articles of Agreement state, "A member shall not use the Fund's general resources to meet a large or sustained outflow of capital . . .." This provision could in principle be used to block the use of a drawing to repay a regional fund. But the Executive Board would be unlikely to invoke this clause if doing so could create or perpetuate a systemic problem.
design the program at the outset, giving rise to a take-it-or-leave-it proposition that the Fund could have difficulty refusing.
Exit sequencing can become a barrier to regional-multilateral coordination even in cases where the rescue is successful. For example, the maximum rollover duration of the CMIM swaps (two years)
is shorter than the standard IMF Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) (three-and-a-quarter to five years).
Some ASEAN+3 officials might be tempted to conclude that, should the CMIM be activated with the IMF link, their credits through the CMIM would be redeemed prior to the IMF's. 15 But this would be a misunderstanding, as the Executive Board would almost certainly insist that any regional credits be renewed until they and IMF credits can be repaid simultaneously. 16 Doing so would require a renegotiation of a key provision of the CMIM, however. Again, this type of issue should be discussed and resolved in advance of, rather than in the heat of, a financial crisis.
Seniority. Relatedly, situations of mixed finance naturally raise the question of the relative seniority of the creditors. In rescue packages involving the IMF, the Fund has always been at the head of the queue; it has held "preferred creditor status." But this seniority is not conferred by the IMF Articles of Agreement;
rather it has been enshrined by convention with the support of its key members, borrowers, and the deference of private and official bilateral creditors. 17 The Executive Board and management of the Fund have therefore had to be vigilant in extracting this provision from the parties to rescue packages in each instance. It should not be taken for granted that other official creditors, including regional financial facilities, will always defer to the IMF on this matter. 18 Conflicts over preferred creditor status could consume valuable time and energy during negotiations in a financial crisis.
Institutional Issues
Beyond the nitty-gritty of how to organize a financial rescue, several institutional questions arise in the relationship between regional financial arrangements and the IMF. The first has to do with organization for external representation. Does the region form a common position on external matters and, if so, Through what instruments and procedures can the IMF strike agreements with regions?
A second set of institutional questions relates to voting and governance. We would expect that representation of countries in the IMF would facilitate the Fund's cooperation with their region.
Specifically, the weight of member states from a particular region in the quota and voting structure of the IMF, and the presence of officials from the region in the Fund's senior staff, is likely to affect the Fund's cooperation with the region. We have already observed that EU-IMF cooperation was facilitated by the numerical dominance of Europe on the Executive Board and the regional identity of the managing director. This need not be a question of favoritism, but rather a matter of knowledge of the region inside the IMF, and vice versa, multiplicity of points of contact at the working level, and convergence of analytical views.
A third set of questions relates to eligibility for membership. Presently, membership in regional financial arrangements and the IMF is restricted to member states. One might reasonably ask whether membership could be expanded to include regional institutions in the IMF-as the European Union is a member in its own right in the WTO-and the IMF in regional organizations. 19 Observer status is common in international organizations and can be quite useful but generally does not allow institutions to draw on the resources of the organization in question.
Spectrum of Cooperation
There is a spectrum of possible ways in which regional financial facilities can cooperate with the IMF and vice versa. These range from technical to policy and then to institutional modalities for cooperation and can be arrayed in order of the degree to which the two institutions sacrifice autonomy. At the less ambitious end of the spectrum, where each institution retains maximum independence, would be IMF advice and technical assistance on the establishment of regional facilities and regional surveillance mechanisms. Periodic or regular IMF contributions to regional surveillance exercises, through for example presentations of Fund staff to meetings of regional officials, are also at the "easy" end of the spectrum.
Parallel financing arrangements-where for example the regional financial arrangement ties its lending 19. Henning (1997, 50-57; , among others, argues that Europe's monetary union should be given membership in the IMF. However, eligibility for membership of the region in the multilateral institution should be conditioned on the region's decision rule-that it establish its common position by majority rather than unanimity or consensus. Under unanimity or consensus, one country or a small group of countries could exercise a veto over important decisions in the IMF by virtue of their blocking position in the region-the "double-veto" problem. This caveat deserves more attention than it often receives.
to Fund program or vice versa-are more ambitious. Contributing partnerships, where one institution contributes funds that are lent on terms negotiated by the other, are substantially more ambitious still.
Providing for membership of the region in the IMF, or vice versa, would represent the ambitious end point of the spectrum. Consider these as we discuss, later below, the possibilities by which the IMF might cooperate with East Asian financial facilities and surveillance.
COMPARISON OF REGIONAL FACILITIES
More than six decades of institution building have generated a substantial list of regional financial arrangements, ranging from those with close links to the IMF to those without. These arrangements vary considerably in size, mandate, and effectiveness and are compared in detail elsewhere. 20 The particular relationship between these arrangements and the IMF is of primary interest here and is summarized in Fund" and the Treasury secures a letter from the managing director certifying borrowers' policies in each instance (Henning 2002, 66-68) . But the secretary is not restricted to using the ESF only in concert with IMF financing.
Despite being inspired in substantial measure by antipathy toward the IMF in East Asia, the CMI and CMIM are more explicitly linked to the IMF than any of the other important regional facilities.
Members of ASEAN+3 must negotiate an IMF program to draw beyond 20 percent of their CMIM allotment, a provision known in the region as the "IMF link." Although the first 20 percent can be significantly larger than the borrower's quota in the IMF, it is likely to be at best only a first tranche in a much larger program, given the volume of financing needed in recent crises. A number of Southeast Asian officials would like to reduce or eliminate the IMF link, and ASEAN+3 reviews it periodically, but the likely creditor countries continue to support it.
EAST ASIA AND THE IMF
ASEAN+3 made the CMIM operational in March 2010. The CMIM is a "self-managed reserve pooling arrangement," which means that foreign exchange reserves are held in separate national accounts but earmarked for contributions to financial rescue packages when the need arises and the group decides to activate. The importance of this step lies in (a) the inclusion of the low-income ASEAN countries and Hong Kong and China in these arrangements for the first time, (b) making disbursements subject to a single decision of the group as a whole rather than separate decisions of the creditor countries, and especially (c) agreement on the governing arrangements, including the relative shares of Japan, China, and
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South Korea. Korean and Japanese officials subsequently proposed that the resources of the CMIM be doubled, to $240 billion, and made available on a precautionary basis.
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ASEAN+3 has also agreed to create an independent secretariat in 2011 in Singapore in order to backstop regional surveillance. The hope of many, distant though it might be, is that a robust surveillance mechanism will permit the CMIM to eventually lend without the borrower also negotiating an IMF program, which is now a requirement. Such a step would complete the transition of East Asian financial arrangements to an Asian monetary fund. These arrangements and their evolution over time have been examined elsewhere; 25 this section addresses the relationship between CMIM, the surveillance unit, and the IMF to examine proposals for interinstitutional cooperation that could be generalized to the IMF's relationship to other regions. Consider first cooperation in the area of surveillance, then in the area of financial support.
Surveillance
Regional surveillance of economic policy has developed gradually over more than a decade within ASEAN+3. 26 Consensus emerged only within the last few years on the creation of an independent secretariat to conduct policy reviews and on the secretariat's location. In spring 2010, it was finally decided that the new surveillance secretariat, named the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office, will be located in Singapore. mation and analysis; it is not charged with developing proposals and submitting them to the board as is the managing director and staff of the IMF. AMRO's staff will be relatively modest in size at the outset.
While ASEAN+3 officials agreed that AMRO and its director are to be "independent," the working relationships are yet to be established. Mindful that independence of AMRO from the IMF might be important to preserve, there are nonetheless several ways in which the two could cooperate. First, the IMF can provide technical advice during the establishment of AMRO, as Asian institutions are also likely to do. Second, the IMF can continue to brief the ASEAN+3 deputies at their surveillance discussions from time to time, as it has done in the past. Third, if AMRO is to specialize in its comparative advantages vis à vis the Fund, per above, it will have to consult with the Fund fairly intensively on the timing, sequencing, and even the substance of the Article IV consultations.
Fourth, and more deeply, Kawai (2009a) has proposed that AMRO officials be included in the Fund's Article IV surveillance missions to ASEAN+3 countries. Doing so might raise some sensitive issues, including with respect to the autonomy of AMRO's analysis, but deserves serious consideration.
The IMF adapted its surveillance procedures to accommodate the bifurcation of monetary and fiscal policymaking in euro area member states and has included European officials in negotiations over programs and conditionality. AMRO officials would benefit from being similarly embedded in IMF Article IV missions and such cooperation could facilitate agreement on policy adjustments to be required as conditions for activating their respective facilities for a member.
It is useful to underscore that the development of regional surveillance has critical ramifications for the East Asia's long-term relationship to the IMF. At the outset of the CMI, Asian officials acknowledged that surveillance would have to evolve in parallel with regional financial facilities if the region were to become genuinely self-reliant. Were the region to sever the IMF link in particular, ASEAN+3 would have to first establish a robust surveillance mechanism that would allow the group to define its own policy conditionality for the CMI/CMIM. Although the effectiveness of AMRO remains to be seen, it does not appear that ASEAN+3 officials have yet devoted the resources or mustered the commitment to raise regional surveillance to this level. For the time being, it appears, the CMIM will cooperate with the IMF in any activation of its arrangements.
Cofinancing
From the beginning, any CMI disbursements would have been linked to Fund programs. While it was understood among ASEAN+3 that a plain vanilla Stand-By Arrangement constituted a "program,"
however, it was not at all clear whether other sorts of IMF credit arrangements could also meet that including the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), 32 and then enhanced the FCL and introduced the Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) in August 2010. 33 With these new facilities, the IMF has responded to the crisis with alacrity and has done so in large measure to address the preferences of East Asian members in particular.
These facilities create in turn new opportunities for cooperation between the IMF and regional financial facilities, including CMIM.
Under the enhanced FCL, countries with "very strong economic fundamentals" and policies can qualify for an IMF credit line, on which they can draw at their option without submitting to ex post conditionality. There is no general limit on their access-the Executive Board decides on the size of the line based on the financing needs of each qualifying country-the line can be accessed for one or two years, and any drawings would be repaid over three-and-a-quarter to five years. Poland, Mexico, and Building on the HAPA, the PCL applies to countries "with good policies but still facing some remaining vulnerabilities," which would therefore have to commit to light ex post conditionality and be monitored.
Compared to the FCL, a broader set of countries can thus qualify for a PCL. A country can receive five times its quota on approval of a PCL, with up to ten times its quota available after 12 months.
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With the introduction of the PCL, two questions arise: (a) whether PCL qualification should also be deemed to satisfy the link and (b) whether the Fund and CMIM could cooperate in parallel
disbursements. An ASEAN+3 decision to allow PCL qualification to satisfy the link would harness the expertise and analysis of the IMF to the resources of the CMIM in a precautionary framework-a useful division of labor. In considering such a move, ASEAN+3 might be wary of the possibility of CMIM disbursing without cofinancing from the Fund, as PCL qualifying members are granted access without the obligation to draw. (The same benefit and complication arise with respect to FCL qualification.) A logical solution would be to agree that the borrower would draw on both facilities equiproportionately. Federal Reserve extended almost $600 billion through these swap lines. 43 The drawings were particularly effective in calming financial markets in Korea.
As is now being proposed, the GSM would similarly offer short-term liquidity in large amounts to combat a systemic or regional financial shock. Moghadam (2010) , Giorgianni (2010), and Choi (2010) .
43. The Bank of Japan was also a heavy user of the swaps. The Monetary Authority of Singapore, by contrast, did not draw.
44. An SLL would require approval by an 85 percent majority in the Board. Under such a scenario, could the CMIM be mobilized in parallel with the GSM or SLL? As a regionalization of short-term, renewable, bilateral swaps, the CMIM could offer liquidity of a duration that would be comparable to some versions of the GSM proposal. 48. Under the staff proposal, the SLL would have a repurchase period of 1¼ to 2 years and charges the same as the credit tranches. CMIM drawings have 90-day maturity and are renewable seven times for a total of up to two years; interest charges are based on LIBOR plus 150 basis points at the initial drawing and first renewal, rising 50 basis points with each renewal up to a ceiling of 300 basis points.
likely force the abandonment of any insistence on equal treatment by Southeast Asian governments.
Regionalism would be better served by acknowledging the heterogeneity of its membership and accepting its practical implications when relating to multilateral institutions and other outside actors.
Contributing Partnership
One could imagine more ambitious cooperation still between CMIM and the IMF. Sussangkarn (2010) raises the possibility of creating associate memberships or contributing partnerships in the CMIM in order to allow Australia, New Zealand, and/or India to participate short of full membership status. While not sitting in the governing bodies of the CMIM, nor eligible to borrow from it, these countries could contribute funds during an activation and attend surveillance and other meetings through associated status. The concept could be taken a step further to allow countries outside the region, such as the United
States, and multilateral institutions, such as the IMF, to participate. The possibility that the IMF might top up financial packages by bilateral lending to members of a regional arrangement and by lending directly to the regional arrangement itself has been floated within the Fund.
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One possible attraction of having the IMF lend to the CMIM, which would lend in turn to one of its members, would be to mobilize IMF resources without the stigma of the Fund. The proposal nonetheless raises several difficulties. First, the IMF would at the same time be relinquishing control over the terms on which the ultimate credit was advanced, which would be difficult for its Executive Board to swallow. Those terms would be decided by the governing bodies of the CMIM instead. Second, an amendment to the Articles of Agreement would be required to use the IMF's General Resources Account (GRA) for this purpose.
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There are also difficulties on the side of ASEAN+3 in IMF lending to the CMIM. First, as presently constituted, the CMIM is not in a position to receive a loan from the IMF or any other organization or country for that matter. The CMIM is a governance framework to jointly mobilize separately held reserves simultaneously and bilaterally. It is not a legal entity that can take on financial obligations on its own authority, such as the ADB or the IMF. Second, of course, using the CMIM as an intermediary in this way would require that ASEAN+3 abandon the IMF link.
Institutional Interdependence
The question as to how CMIM and the IMF should work together is central to the futures of both of 50. But an amendment would not be necessary to draw on the non-GRA resources of the IMF for this purpose.
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as part of the broader multilateral context (Henning 2008) , and the IMF's response to this challenge.
Consider first CMIM, then the IMF.
Asian financial regionalism has been deeply ambivalent about the IMF, motivated by resentment of the institution yet facilitated by its presence. The CMI was a substitute for the Asian Monetary Fund proposed by the Japanese Ministry of Finance in 1997, a compromise among those officials (both within Japan and East Asia more broadly) wanting to retain ties to the multilateral regime and those wanting autonomy. However, the IMF link, which survived the transition from CMI to CMIM, inhibited the use of these arrangements in the recent crisis, owing to the "stigma" of the Fund in Asia. At the same time, the CMIM is too small to be viable in a crisis without additional financing from other sources, the IMF being the leading candidate. So, if the CMIM is going to be used in the foreseeable future and evolve, it will have to specify the modalities for working with the IMF.
The IMF is similarly dependent on striking a strong working relationship with ASEAN+3, having lost substantial credibility in East Asia after the 1997-98 crisis. Rehabilitating it within the region depends on (a) modifying its facilities and programs to better match the preferences of Asian members, an area where it has made great strides, and (b) cooperating with regional institutions including the CMIM.
Through the latter, it can have a regional partner, imparting local ownership of the program. The IMF has therefore wisely sought to do more of both.
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper has argued that the cooperation between the IMF and European authorities in recent programs in Central and Eastern Europe, Greece, and Ireland, while successful, is not likely to be easily replicated in other regions. The European numerical dominance at the IMF and the European identity of the managing director-a person intimately familiar with the decision making machinery of the European Union, euro area, and key member states-makes the effectiveness of this cooperation unique to Europe.
The increasing number and size of regional financial arrangements, severity of financial crises, and political constraints on lending raise the costs of potential failure of cooperation between regional funds and the IMF. The IMF and regional financial arrangements should therefore arrange key elements of cooperation in advance, rather than negotiate them in the midst of crises as they have done in the past.
The G-20 finance ministers and summit meetings are the appropriate forums in which to discuss the relationship between the IMF and regional financial arrangements. The member states of the G-20 are the leading members of both multilateral and regional financial institutions. These governments were principally responsible for creating both sets of institutions, while giving insufficient thought to coordinating the mandates and work among them, and are thus principally responsible for solving the problems thus created. The G-20 cannot dispose of these matters itself, but the group can prepare decisions to be taken with the other members of the IMF and regional institutions to strengthen the connections between them.
The previous section offered several recommendations for ASEAN+3 and the IMF to cooperate with respect to surveillance and cofinancing. These could be extended to other regional financial arrangements. Specifically, regional funds in general could make qualification under the enhanced FCL and the PCL sufficient to satisfy their standards for disbursement and could disburse in parallel with IMF disbursements under a GSM or SLL, should one of those mechanisms eventually be introduced. The IMF should continue to support regional surveillance mechanisms, assist with their design, and share analysis with regional bodies. At the discretion of the member state undergoing review, in addition, the IMF could include regional secretariats in Article IV missions. The G-20 finance ministers and heads of government should advance proposals for their regional financial arrangements and the Fund to cooperate in these ways and encourage development of the GSM/SLL within the IMF.
The diversity of regional arrangements poses an issue for the IMF's cooperation with them. the Fund must be general enough to embrace both types of regions yet also specific enough to provide meaningful guidance. Second, the IMF's role is likely to differ from region to region.
This section offers a set of basic principles that should guide the design and organization of the practical modalities for cooperation. It then offers a set of guidelines for regional financial arrangements and the IMF in four specific areas. The section concludes with recommendations for adapting institutions at both levels. Together, these proposals constitute what might be described as an Interinstitutional
Agenda for the G-20.
Principles
The governments of member states of the regions and the IMF should be guided by three principles when considering the modalities of interinstitutional cooperation.
1. Specialization along comparative advantage. Regional institutions might have comparative advantage in local knowledge and ownership, for example, whereas the IMF has it with respect to universal risk pooling and insulation from backlash against austere conditionality. In crisis prevention and management, both sets of institutions can benefit from specialization according to comparative advantage and exchange.
Because the operational capabilities and political characteristics of the regional facilities vary widely, though, the comparative advantage of the IMF will differ in each region.
2. Prohibition against competition in critical areas. Financial stability can be served by competition between institutions in some select areas, such as the provision of quality information, analysis, and forecasts.
But in other areas, such as terms of lending and policy conditionality, competition would be corrosive, pushing solutions away from the optimal tradeoff between adjustment and financing. Left to their own devices, institutions will not necessarily compete only in the appropriate areas. Member governments should establish clear understandings about where competition is acceptable and where their regional and multilateral institutions should avoid it.
3. Transparency. Transparency varies significantly across regional arrangements and the IMF. Once relatively opaque, the IMF has become remarkably more transparent during the 13 years since the Asian financial crisis. 51 The CMIM, on the other hand, has lagged; ASEAN+3 finance ministers have published a summary of the agreement establishing the CMIM but not the agreement itself. 52 To diminish the likelihood of last-minute surprises in the negotiation of rescue packages, the terms and governance of multilateral and regional arrangements should be shared knowledge across both levels. Differences across facilities will tempt some parties to use the least transparent facility in a financial rescue. To facilitate public understanding and market credibility, regional financial facilities should be at least as transparent as the IMF. If differences persist, joint operations should adopt the disclosure protocol of the most, not least, transparent facility.
Guidelines
With these principles in mind, the regional financial arrangements and the IMF should develop a set of more specific guidelines for region-IMF cooperation. Involving obligations for both the IMF and regional financial arrangements, these guidelines would address multilateral review of regional arrangements, conditionality, private-sector involvement, and seniority, among other matters. Multilateral Review. The international community has reviewed the consistency of regional financial facilities with countries' multilateral commitments in a completely ad hoc fashion or has failed to review them at all. There is no process or procedure through which such arrangements are evaluated formally.
Some have been discussed by the IMF's Executive Board, but neither the CMI, CMIM, NAFA, nor EFSF, for example, have been the focus of sustained board review. Such reviews are needed in order to (a) identify any potential conflicts between these arrangements and the IMF and (b) anticipate any sticking points in negotiations over parallel financing. It is far better to identify such snags in advance than to encounter them unexpectedly during eleventh-hour bargaining in a financial crisis. All members of the IMF, including the United States and European member states, should agree to present their regional arrangements to the Executive Board for review.
Conditionality. Policy conditionality is of course a critical question in the relationship between the IMF and regional financial arrangements. While a relaxation of conditionality might be appropriate in some cases, the IMF and regional facilities must not ease the policy adjustments required of borrowers owing simply to competition with one another. Despite its acknowledged mistakes, 53 the IMF still holds a general comparative advantage over other regional and multilateral organizations in the specification of program conditionality. The IMF holds this position by virtue of (1) its analytic resources and the experience and expertise of its staff, (2) its global perspective, which confers a unique ability to draw lessons across countries and regions, and (3) the reluctance of regional neighbors to impose harsh conditionality even when that is necessary. Note as well that the IMF has adapted its conditionality on Stand-By Arrangements considerably over the last several years and has now introduced facilities that attach no and only light ex post policy conditions. 54 Until they develop their own capacities fully, regional financial arrangements are thus wise to import or borrow the IMF's conditionality. Åslund (2010, 67-73) . On the other hand, European authorities have opposed the imposition of "haircuts" on the senior holders of Irish bank debt out of fear of contagion to other banks in the euro area.
58. For discussion of the IMF as the most senior preferred creditor, see Martha (1990); Rieffel (2003, 31-41, 68-75) ; Roubini and Setser (2004, 252-63); Gelpern (2005 Gelpern ( , 2007 .
59. For discussion of the merits of formalizing the hierarchy of creditors, see Gelpern (2005) and Roubini and Setser (2004, 277-87) . Although these analysts are doubtful about the feasibility of doing so across a broad range of creditors, public and private, formalizing the relative status of the IMF and other official institutions would be a narrower and far simpler exercise.
Ideally, these guidelines would be incorporated into a code of conduct governing the relationship between regional facilities and the IMF. 60 Such a code could accommodate the substantial variation among regional arrangements. While a code of conduct would still be desirable, the G-20 and the institutions should advance cooperation along each of these substantive points independently if agreement on a more formal code cannot be achieved. Broad acceptance of these guidelines even as "soft" obligations would represent progress in organizing cooperation between financial institutions.
The IMF is not in a position to dictate what is permissible in the way of regional financial agreements among its members. The purpose of the guidelines proposed here is not to give such jurisdiction to the Fund or to protect the bureaucratic interests of the institution. If a subgroup of member states wishes to create an "IMF-plus" regional arrangement and is willing to commit the resources to make it effective, then protecting the bureaucratic interest of the Fund cannot be a legitimate objection. But its comprehensive membership and cross-regional purview make the IMF the best institution in which to locate international consultation over regional arrangements. The practical inseparability of regional financing from IMF programs, at least for the moment, also makes the Fund the best location for coordination.
Institutions
The third component of this agenda addresses changes to the structures and mandates of the IMF and regional institutions.
First, regional financial arrangements should create clear and coherent mechanisms for external representation, in order to engage the IMF and other international financial institutions as regions.
External representation of the euro area was largely an afterthought in the Maastricht Treaty and, while now established, is cumbersome and often contentious. 61 No explicit arrangement for representation has been agreed among ASEAN+3; the IMF must engage with CMIM through its members, none of which appear to be formally authorized by the group to speak for the region.
Second, for its part, the IMF and other international financial institutions should provide mechanisms for facilitating and receiving the collective representation of the regional institutions. The euro area is represented in the Executive Board under arrangements involving the EU presidency, Commission, 60. Elsewhere (Henning 2002 (Henning , 2006 , I have proposed adoption of such a code and the financial equivalent of Article XXIV of the GATT and Article 5 of the GATS. The conflict between the Japanese Ministry of Finance and US Treasury, among other key actors, over the proposal to create an Asian Monetary Fund in 1997 might have been avoided if there had been clearer ex ante criteria for regional financial arrangements that were acceptable to the international community. Formal criteria and principles could preempt similar conflicts in the future and provide firm guidance for the creation and evolution of regional arrangements and the IMF.
61. See, among others, Henning (1997 Henning ( , 2007a Henning ( , 2007b to work simultaneously with a number of regions effectively. As this is done, care must be taken to avoid the double-veto problem, which arises when one member or a few members hold(s) a veto over a regional position, which in turn can veto a decision or otherwise stymie decision making in the IMF (Henning 1997, 55-56) .
Third, IMF governance reform will have important bearing on the institution's ability to cooperate with regions. Quota shares and voting power are in the process of being shifted toward emerging markets, Asian members in particular. 63 The number of European seats in the Executive Board has recently been reduced by two in favor of emerging-market countries. When the present managing director departs, whenever that might be, the members of the IMF should appoint an Asian as his successor. Although more progress would be desirable, these reforms help to boost Asian confidence in and willingness to cooperate with the IMF. The members of the IMF and the G-20 should guard against weakening cooperation with Europe in the process, however, by establishing interinstitutional conventions on an ex ante basis.
Finally, the agenda raises the twin questions of the eligibility to draw on IMF resources and membership of regional organizations in the IMF. Some analysts have proposed that the IMF lend to regional arrangements for on-lending to member states. Presently, under the Articles of Agreement only national governments can be members of the Fund and draw on its resources. IMF lending to a regional financial arrangement would thus require an amendment to the Articles that would either provide borrowing eligibility to nonmembers or membership to qualifying regions. The former would be difficult to accommodate under the existing financial structure of the Fund. The latter, while raising the conceptually intriguing prospect of creating a "Fund of regional funds," goes well beyond what members would be now willing to contemplate. Nonetheless, as I have argued elsewhere, monetary unions that meet a high standard of cohesiveness and have adopted majority decision making should be accepted as members of the Fund, their member states having surrendered monetary sovereignty to the regional union (Henning 2006 coordination with it and should be one of the key objectives of the next round of reform discussions in both the IMF and European Union.
Membership for regions is closely related to the eligibility of member states for IMF financing.
During the months leading up to the announcement of the 2010 rescue package for Greece, many officials in Europe sought to block drawings by Greece from the IMF. These officials preferred a wholly
European solution in order to use the Greek crisis to strengthen European rules and institutions and, in some cases, to reduce the influence of outsiders. Despite the euro area's ultimate embrace of the Fund, the motivation of some in Europe in creating the ESM and a generally more robust macroeconomic and structural regime is to avoid having to turn to the IMF in the future. If members of the euro area were someday made ineligible for loans from the Fund by European conventions or rules, however, the rationale for separate memberships by the European governments would evaporate. Membership would then logically devolve from the member states to the euro area. The same would apply to other regional institutions barring Fund drawings by members. Member states should then accept the logical consequences by reforming the membership rules and governing arrangements of the Fund accordingly.
The principles, guidelines, and recommendations are offered here as elements of an Interinstitutional Agenda for consideration in the G-20 finance ministers and summit meetings, as well as within the regional and multilateral institutions themselves. National governments around the world have been building regional arrangements for several decades. With the CMIM and ASEAN+3 surveillance mechanisms now in place and Europe on the threshold of adopting a new permanent regime, now is the time to review and advance cooperation between regions and the IMF. The increasing size, complexity, and politicization of financial programs make ad hoc approaches to interinstitutional cooperation risky, especially for contingencies outside Europe. The international community will want to lay the basis for cooperation between regional facilities and the IMF during the present period of relative financial calm (at least outside Europe), before another wave of crises approaches. 
